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Information Theory Based Detection Against
Network Behavior Mimicking DDoS Attacks
Shui Yu, Member, IEEE, Wanlei Zhou, Member, IEEE, and Robin Doss, Member, IEEE
Abstract— DDoS is a spy-on-spy game between attackers and
detectors. Attackers are mimicking network traffic patterns
to disable the detection algorithms which are based on these
features. It is an open problem of discriminating the mimicking
DDoS attacks from massive legitimate network accessing. We
observed that the zombies use controlled function(s) to pump
attack packages to the victim, therefore, the attack flows to
the victim are always share some properties, e.g. packages
distribution behaviors, which are not possessed by legitimate
flows in a short time period. Based on this observation, once
there appear suspicious flows to a server, we start to calculate
the distance of the package distribution behavior among the
suspicious flows. If the distance is less than a given threshold,
then it is a DDoS attack, otherwise, it is a legitimate accessing.
Our analysis and the preliminary experiments indicate that the
proposed method can discriminate mimicking flooding attacks
from legitimate accessing efficiently and effectively.
Index Terms— DDoS detection, distribution distance.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE distributed denial of service (DDoS) is a criticalthreat to the Internet, flooding attack is the most popular
method taken by hackers. To guard against flooding attacks,
researchers have designed and implemented a number of
countermeasures based on traffic features [1], [2], [3]. [3] tried
to use three dimensions, traffic patterns, client characteristics
and file reference characteristics, to discriminate the flash
event (surge massive legitimate assessing) from DoS attacks.
However, this counter attack method can not follow the ever
changing attack methods, as the attack patterns are changing
from time to time. Moreover, the attacker will mimic the
network traffic pattern of flash event, which will disable
the detector quickly. The entropy detector mentioned in the
paper [4] used entropy very shallowly. It can raise the
alarm for a sudden massive accessing, however, it can not
discriminate the DDoS attacks from the surge of legitimate
accessing. [2] suggested to separate flash crowd from DDoS
flooding by “other” performance metrics (except the change-
point detection method) to capture their difference. However,
there is no clue about the possible metrics in the paper at
all. Based on our knowledge, there are no effective methods
to discriminate DDoS flooding attacks from the legitimate
surging accessing so far.
In this letter, we are motivated by identifying the attacks
which simulate normal network accessing patterns to fly under
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Fig. 1. A simple attack diagram in a community network.
the radar. In order to achieve the goal, we take use of
information theory to explore the distance (relative entropy
in information theory) among network flows. We apply our
methods on community networks, e.g. ISPs, in which a
number of routers can cooperate to identify DDoS at the very
early stage. When the current DDoS detection algorithms, e.g.
the entropy detection algorithm, raise an attack alarm, it may
be a false alarm. For example, it is a surging of legitimate
accessing for a breaking news or event, unfortunately, these
legitimate accessing will be blocked as DDoS attacks. On
the other hand, real attacks maybe reach the victim via huge
number of paths with a ‘normal’ package rate and distribution
for each path, in this case, the current detection algorithms
will be fooled and can not identify the attack. In this letter, we
concentrate on solving this problem. With our method, once
a DDoS attack alarm is raised, the routers of the community
network will calculate the distance among the suspicious flows
to the possible victim on different paths, respectively. If the
distances among the suspicious flows are the same or very
close, we can therefore identify it as an attack. The remainder
of the paper is organized as follows.
The system analysis and modeling are done in Section 2.
The distance detection algorithm is presented in Section 3. Our
experiments are discussed in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5,
we summarize the paper and discuss the future work.
II. SYSTEM ANALYSIS
In a community network, we can manage and configure our
routers. Therefore, the routers can cooperate with each other
to identify the DDoS attacks. Figure 1 displays a very simple
attack diagram with two attack flows in a community network
with three routers and one server as victim.
We have a few assumptions in order to make the discussion
clear and easy to be understood.
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1) The attackers use the same function to generate attack
packages at the zombies, for example, the Poisson
distribution or the Chi-square distribution.
2) There is only one server in the community network that
is under attacking or massive accessing at a time.
3) The network system is linear and stable (this is quite
reasonable for a short time period).
Similar to [5], we define the packages which share the
same destination address as a flow on each of the routers in a
community network. Once an alarm is raised, the routers start
to sample the number of packages of the suspicious flows in a
time unit, e.g. 0.05 second, respectively. Suppose in an attack
scenario, the attacker uses a random variable X to control the
generation speed of the attack packages. The possible methods
could be:
1) Using a constant speed to generate the packages,
namely,P (X = C) = 1 , and C is a constant;
2) Increasing the number of attack packages according to
attack time t, X = at+ b, a and b are constants;
3) Simulating the network traffic as Poisson distribution,
namely, P (X = k) = λ
ke−λ
k! , k = 0, 1..., and λ is a
constant;
For example, in the community network as Figure 1, once
a DDoS attack alarm is raised, we find that there are two
suspicious flows,fp and fq, the sampling job can be done
either on router R2 and R3 or R1 for a suffice time period T .
Once the sampling job is done, we obtain the two distributions
for fp and fq, respectively,{
P (X) = p(x1, x2, x3...xn)
Q(X) = q(x1, x2, x3...xn)
(1)
We hence obtain the distance, relative entropy or Kullback-
Leibler distance [2], of the two distributions as follows,
D(p||q) =
∑
xεχ
p(x) log
p(x)
q(x)
(2)
where χ is the sample space of X
If fp and fq are attacking flows, then they are generated
by the same function f(x) at different zombies. Let gp(.) and
gq(.) be the system functions for flow fp and fq from the
zombie to the sampling routers, respectively. Then we have,
{
p(x) = gp(f(x))
q(x) = gq(f(x))
(3)
Ideally, if gp(.) and gq(.) are linear, then D(p||q) = 0.
Although it is impossible that the Internet satisfies the as-
sumption, however, the distance of two attack flows should be
very small compared with the case that one is attack flow and
one is normal flow. We us the following formula to make the
judgment of the two flows, p and q, are the same flows (attack
flows) or not.
A(p, q) =
{
1 D(p||q) ≤ δ
0 D(p||q) > δ (4)
Where δ is a given small number as a threshold. We now
extend the number of attack flows to n(n > 2) . We make
m(2m < n) flow pairs randomly from the n suspicious
flows. Notated as pi, qi, i = 1, 2, ...m , respectively. Hence,
TABLE I
THE DISTANCE ALGORITHM
1. Identify the suspicious flow on the local router
2. Count the number of packages of the suspicious flow in a time
slot t.
3. Identify the sample space, x1, x2...xn of sampling period T,
and the responding frequency
4. Calculate the possibility distribution of the flow as
p(xi) =
fi∑n
1=1
fi
, i = 1, 2...n
5. Submit the distribution to an aggregate router, e.g. R1 in Figure 1,
to calculate the distance according to equation (2).
6. Compare the distances for the suspicious flows on different
routers in the community network, and make the decision
based on equation (4)
7. If it is an attack, then discard the packages of the suspicious
flow on the routers.
we can have Ai(pi, qi), i = 1, 2...m . Suppose the possibility
of misjudgment for each pair is p, then the positive judgment
for an attack could be expressed as follow.
A(p1, p2, ...pm, q1, q2...qm) = 1− pm (5)
For example, if p = 0.5 , and we expect 99% positive for
the judgment, then the condition is m ≥ 7.
A. The Distance Algorithm
Based on the analysis of the previous section, we have the
corresponding algorithm. The algorithm is listed as in Table
I.
Based on this algorithm, we can identify DDoS attacks as
early as possible, therefore, actions will be taken to discard
the attack packages.
III. THE SIMULATIONS
In order to confirm the proposed method, we conducted a
number of simulations. We implemented the ARPA network
in Opnet. The simulation environment includes 21 routers and
336 network nodes. We tested two different attack methods,
Poisson attack and Chi-square attack, with background traffic
as Poisson distribution. We compare the distance between an
attack flow and a normal flow, the distance between two attack
flows in different attack scenarios, respectively. The results are
presented in Figure 2 and Figure 3.
From the above findings, we obtain that:
1) The system gets to stable after 50 time units after the
sampling procedure starts. If we make 20 samples per
second, then we only need 2.5 seconds to make the
decision.
2) The distance between an attack flow and a normal flow
is normally around 1.5 once the system is stable.
3) The distances between two attack flows are less than 0.2
( δ = 0.2), which is pretty different from the distance
between one attack flow and one normal flow. Therefore,
we can conclude that our methods can discriminate
the DDoS attacks from legitimate surge of accessing
effectively and efficiently.
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Fig. 2. Distance comparison for Poisson attacks.
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Fig. 3. Distance comparison for Chi-Square attacks.
IV. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
In this letter, we are motivated by discriminating the DDoS
attacks from surge legitimate accessing, and identifying at-
tacks at the early stage, even before the attack packages
reach the target server. We concentrate on the different attack
flows of one attack essentially share the same attack pattern,
which is not possessed by legitimate accessing flows in a
short time period. Therefore, once the DDoS attack detection
algorithms raise the alarm of a potential attack, we start to
calculate the distance among the different suspicious flows in
the community network. If the distance is less than a given
threshold, for example 0.2 based on our experiments, then it
is an attack, otherwise, we treat it as a surge of legitimate
accessing.
The advantages of the proposed methods are
1) The detection and defense can be implemented in a
community network easily. Further, it can be done
independently in the community network.
2) The detection can identify the attack at the very early
stage, e.g. a few seconds.
3) The proposed method does not have the pressure of
storage of the past packages for analysis, it also does
not cost the computing power of routers much.
We present the basic idea in this letter, and our theoretical
analysis and simulations demonstrate that it is an excellent
method for DDoS detection. However, there is more interest-
ing work to do, which includes,
1) The compromise of detection accuracy and the time of
confirming is a critical aspect in the battle with DDoS
attacks, how to obtain an optimal solution for this is
quite demanded in practice;
2) Identify DDoS attacks when there are quite a number
of legitimate accessing to the same server.
3) Attackers may using multiple attack package generation
functions in one attack, trying to fool our detection
algorithm, e.g. they may use random functions with
different seeds, however, we believe, there are definitely
rules behind the attack distributions if they are ‘man-
made’ traffic rules. This is also a direction that we are
going to explore with high interest.
4) Extensive experiments on the Internet against real
DDoS attacks
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